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1. 
	There is, uncontroversially, some duty to help those who are living lives of great deprivation, at least where we can do so without bearing an unreasonable burden.  We might call this a duty of “humanitarianism”.  This duty requires us to help those who are living in great deprivation because they are doing so badly.  It is relatively uncontroversial that some such duty exists.  For instance, there are few who would say we needn’t do anything to prevent easily avoidable starvation.  However, it is rather more controversial what the best way to fulfill this duty is, how much of a burden it requires one to bear and so on.  
	This duty of humanitarianism is the minimal requirement bearing on the morality of resource distribution.  But many of us think that there are, in addition, requirements of justice.  In particular, many of us are “egalitarians”.  Egalitarians are not just concerned about levels of avoidable suffering in our society, they are also concerned with its inequalities and think that these inequalities are unjust, or unjust unless they can be given a special justification.​[1]​  They thus think that we should have state policies which address these inequalities.  Some familiar egalitarian policy proposals for addressing inequality include  progressive taxation, a redistributive welfare state, heavy investment in education, minimum wages and so on.  Others, such as non-egalitarian liberals, may also endorse these policies.  But their justification for the policies is different.  They might say redistribution is needed to alleviate need or to place limits on the political power any individual can gain.  What distinguishes the egalitarian is that she thinks inequality is itself unjust (absenting a special justification for it) and endorses these policies as a means of redressing inequality.   
	 These policies are, of course, extremely controversial in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world.  It's thus important for those attracted to egalitarianism to have something to say in defense of their views and I’m going to begin this paper by considering what justifications could be offered for egalitarian policies.  What argument can egalitarians give for the claim that justice requires the sort of policies they endorse?  
	That question is important in its own right.  But answering it is also essential for addressing another issue that political philosophers have recently begun to focus on.  Egalitarianism, as I’ve described it, is a view about policies that affect the distribution of wealth within a particular society.  We can also ask about distributive justice in the global context, about the distribution of wealth between different societies and their members.  In particular, we can ask, “If you’re an egalitarian about distributive justice within a society, what should you say about global distributive justice, about distributive justice across different societies?”  As we shall see, different ways of defending egalitarianism for the domestic sphere have very different implications for global distributive justice.  
	I’m going to argue, firstly, that some prominent views about how to defend domestic egalitarianism are mistaken and that there is a better alternative available.  Secondly, I’m going to argue that this means some central ways of thinking about global justice are mistaken.  And, finally, I will suggest how my own view about how to defend domestic egalitarianism can be used to develop a quite different theory of global distributive justice.  
	I’m not actually going to discuss every way of defending egalitarian policies.  There are many arguments philosophers have offered for egalitarian policies.  For instance, some utilitarians have suggested that the utility individuals get from resources exhibits diminishing marginal returns and that, hence, more equal distributions of wealth should be promoted in order to maximize aggregate utility.  Others, “communitarians” perhaps, have argued for redistribution on the grounds that it engenders more a cohesive and sympathetic community life within a society and that only in a community of this kind can there be stable democratic political institutions. 
	Though these and other justifications for egalitarianism are important, I'm going to be more narrowly focused in this paper.  I'm going to focus mainly on one particular strand of egalitarian thought, namely that which relies centrally on the notion of fairness.  In political philosophy, that strand rose to prominence with the publication of John Rawls' theory of “Justice as Fairness” and remains central in contemporary discussions of distributive justice.  “Fairness” is also frequently appealed to in political debate about distribution.  For instance, when Jo Biden was asked to defend the policy of raising taxes on those earning more than $250,000 a year, he replied that this policy was justified out of “fairness” to the middle class.  

2.  
	The most prominent view about how fairness might figure in an argument for egalitarian policies is “luck egalitarianism”.  This view is inspired by certain passages of Rawls and Dworkin, but its central proponents include G.A. Cohen, Richard Arneson and John Roemer.​[2]​  The core idea of luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair if one person has less than another through sheer bad luck and that justice requires the elimination of such unfair disadvantage.  Something needs to be said about what it is for someone to be disadvantaged through “sheer bad luck” and the most common path is to say that an inequality is due to sheer bad luck, and hence unfair, if someone has less than others through no fault of her own.  
	The idea is that if it is my fault that I'm in a position where I have less than others, say because I made bad decisions, then I cannot say that I’ve just been unlucky and so I cannot complain that it is unfair that I have less.  For instance, if I’ve chosen to squander my money in the arcade or set a match to it, then I can’t say it’s unfair that I now have less than others.  But, if it's not my fault that I have less, if I can't be held responsible for being in that position, then it is just sheer bad luck that I have less and I can complain that this is unfair.  
	Here, then, is a canonical statement of the luck egalitarian view: G.A. Cohen writes that his “animating conviction in political philosophy is that an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust, and that nothing can remove that particular injustice.”​[3]​  The unfairness of such inequalities, on Cohen’s view, makes a strong prima facie case for policies that aim to eradicate them.  
	To defend egalitarian policies (some sort of redistributive welfare state, for instance) on luck egalitarian grounds one needs to fill in a number of details.  For instance, one needs to say something about when exactly someone should be thought at fault for having less than another.  And having done that, a lot of empirical work would need to be done to show that some important class of inequalities in our society are faultless, according to the relevant standard.  Filling in these details is hard and presents serious difficulties for the luck egalitarian, but we can set these issues aside for present purposes.  Now that we have the basics of the luck egalitarian position in view, I’m going to illustrate a more fundamental problem for the theory.  

3.
	Start by considering ordinary appeals to fairness in our everyday moral thinking.  One way that we talk about fairness concerns fairness in the way that people are being treated.  Here are some examples.  Suppose that a parent were to neglect one of her children for the sake of their doted on sibling.  We would consider this unfair.  More specifically, we would think that the parent’s treatment of the less favored child was unfair.  It is unfair for the parent to be doing so little for this child compared with the other.  
	Here is another case.  Suppose that within a company men earn greater wages than women who are doing just the same work.  This is surely unfair.  In this case what is unfair is the company’s treatment of its employees, giving arbitrary advantages to its male employees over female.  
	Finally, consider a carpool scheme where some friends cooperate to reduce the amount of wear to their cars from traveling to work.  They take turns driving each other to work, but over time one friend consistently finds herself doing more driving than the others.  She is being treated unfairly because she is being expected to accept a greater share of the burdens of the scheme than the others.  
	In each of these cases of unfairness, what is unfair is how some person or institution is treating certain people.  The moral defect is in the relation that the person or institution has put itself in to those people.  For example, in one case, the parent is defectively in a position of doing much more for one child than the other and, in another, the company is defectively offering a greater share of its profits to some members over other, relevantly similar, members.  
	When discussing these cases of unfair treatment, we sometimes also call certain distributions of goods unfair.  For instance, when discussing the sexist company, we might say that it is unfair that certain female members have a lesser income than certain men.  But it seems clear enough that the distribution of goods here is only thought to be derivatively unfair.  The unfairness of the distribution derives from the unfair treatment that the employees have been subject too.​[4]​  The primary subject of unfairness in these cases is the way people are being treated.  
	Now, there is another very different kind of claim about fairness that people also make in our everyday moral discourse.  People are inclined to call certain distributions unfair, even in circumstances where it is obvious that no-one has been treated unfairly.  We might call this “cosmic unfairness;” unfairness in the world that is independent of how anyone is being, or has been, treated.   
	Take, for instance, the distribution of natural talents.  Some individuals are born with greater natural talents, or propensities to develop certain talents.  They are born with genes that dispose them to be more intelligent than others, have greater physical strength and so on.  Setting aside whether or not there is a God, no agent decided that things should be like this.  No-one selected her rather than him to have a greater natural intelligence or seems to be responsible for the distribution being one way rather than another.  
	Yet, many people call inequalities in the distribution of natural talent unfair.  They say such things as “No matter how hard I train, I’ll never be as good a soccer player as her.  I just won’t be able to kick the ball as hard.  It’s so unfair.”  Or they might say, “It's completely unfair that I was born tone deaf but she was born with a wonderful ear for music.”  Any unfairness in these cases cannot be derivative from unfairness in how anyone has been, or is being, treated.  It must be “cosmic unfairness,” unfairness in the world that is independent of how anyone has been treated.  

4.
	So, we have identified two quite different sorts of fairness judgements in our common-sense morality.  One set of judgements concerns how people are being treated: judgements about fair and unfair treatment.  And a second, quite different, sort of judgment concerns cosmic unfairness: fairness in the distribution of advantages, which is independent of how anyone has been treated.  
	Now, when the luck egalitarian claims that certain distributions of resources are unfair, she is clearly speaking of cosmic unfairness.  For, on her view, it is unfair for one person to have less than another (through no fault of her own), irrespectively of whether she has been treated unfairly.  We can ask then, “Is it a good idea to rely on the notion of cosmic unfairness to justify egalitarian policies?”  
	I think it is a bad idea and we can see the reason why by noticing an important difference between claims about unfair treatment and claims about cosmic unfairness.  The difference concerns what we can justify by referring to these different kinds of unfairness.  In particular, these different kinds of unfairness play a very different role in determining what actions ought to be performed.  The difference is that there are clear duties grounded in facts about unfair treatment while there are no such duties grounded in facts (if they are facts) about cosmic unfairness.  
	All else being equal, one ought not to treat others unfairly.  Or, if you like, there is a prima facie duty to not treat others unfairly.  Thus, judgments about unfair treatment have clear implications for what we ought to do.  If a person would treat others unfairly in performing a certain action then, all else being equal, she ought not to perform that action.  For instance, take the parent who favors one child over the other, despite the two children being similar in needs, abilities and so on.  This is a case of unfair treatment, the parent is treating the less favored child unfairly.  And because it is unfair to treat her child like this, she ought, all else being equal, not to do so.  She may also have a duty to make up for the results of previous unfair treatment.  
	What relation does cosmic unfairness bear to what we ought to do?  Presumably, if there is any general principle here it says that we ought, all else being equal, to remove, or reduce, any cosmic disadvantage.  Whereas the duty to correct the results of unfair treatment falls on the agent who was being unfair, a plausible duty to correct cosmic unfairness must fall on all agents.  
	Do we all have such a duty?  Take the distribution of natural talents.  If there is a duty to correct cosmic unfairness, then we must all take steps to correct the unfairness of some being born with greater natural talent than others.  Of course, it would be very difficult, and likely objectionably intrusive, to actually redistribute the natural talents themselves.  But we could instead fulfill our duty to reduce cosmic unfairness by compensating the less talented with resources or some other good.  
Must we do so?  Surely not, it seems to me.  The mere fact that person A is less naturally intelligent, or gifted in some other respect, than some other person B does not impose on me a duty to help A rise to level of B or to compensate A with resources.  Think of any familiar instance of one person having lesser natural sporting ability, philosophical talent, musical gifts and so on.  If the person really wants to have a greater natural ability, say their life goal is to play in the manner of their favorite violinist, we might feel bad for them and we might, in a spirit of generosity, help them out in some way.  But helping them is surely supererogatory.  There is no duty to compensate for all natural inequalities of talent.  
It might be said that in the cases just discussed there is no duty to compensate because the goods involved are not important enough.  But take a case where differences in natural talent seem to confer huge benefits.  Take, for instance, the basketball player Shaquille O'Neal.  By the age of 32 O’Neal had amassed a fortune of $222 million dollars.  So, O’Neal earns many times more than the median earner.  So, this should be a paradigm case of an inequality that egalitarians will find unjust.  But why is it unjust?  
The luck egalitarian might say the following:  Shaq is 7’1” and blessed with many natural gifts of dexterity, speed and so on.   These natural gifts give him a much greater earning potential than the rest of us.  But it’s sheer good fortune that he has those talents and not us.  Thus, it is unfair that Shaq has these talents and all the benefits they bring.  We should therefore have redistributive policies to compensate the rest of us for Shaq’s unfair advantages.  
Is this a good argument for redistribution?  Well there are many people who will agree that it is unlucky, and unfair, that the rest of us lack Shaq’s talents.  But few will think that this is a good reason for insisting that he, or anyone else else, must compensate us for being less naturally gifted.  As long as we think of Shaq’s millions as among the benefits of his natural gifts, there does not seem to be a good case for making him give them up.​[5]​
Though I have no general duty to compensate for inequalities of natural talent, there are clear cases where I should help someone who is born disadvantaged.  For instance, suppose that someone is born severely disabled and unable to lead a decent life without assistance.  I am morally required to help such a person, at least assuming that I can do so without bearing an excessive burden.  But we do not need to appeal to any supposed cosmic unfairness to explain why I should help.  We can give a better explanation by appealing to a duty of charity, or beneficence, that requires me to aid those who are in serious need.  The reason I must help the disabled person is that she is in serious need, not because there is a general duty to reduce the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world.  	
What about cases of unfair treatment?  Might they be best accounted for by a duty to reduce cosmic unfairness?  Earlier I discussed some examples of unfair treatment, on the part of parents, companies, and so on.  I said that in such cases we sometimes call certain distributions are unfair, such as the distribution of wage income within the firm, but that any unfairness in these distributions is derived from the unfair treatment of the people involved.  This might be denied.  It might be said that in fact what makes the forms of treatment in these cases unfair is their effects on the distribution of advantages and hence the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world.  
For example, it might be said that inequalities of advantages between men and women are cosmically unfair and that it is unfair for a company to pay men and women differently because of the effect that doing so has on the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world.  In this way, a duty to reduce cosmic unfairness might be used to explain why various forms of treatment are unfair.  
I am doubtful, however, that it would be a very good explanation.   Consider the case of parents.  It is unfair for a parent to favor one child over another, say by giving them a superior education.  On the proposed explanation, this is because doing so would contribute to the amount of cosmic unfairness in the world.  What makes the parent’s actions wrong, on this view, is their effect on the overall distribution of advantages.  
Now, we would judge a parent harshly for even very small differences in their treatment of their own children, such as giving one a slightly better education than the other.  We would do this even where both children are, by average standards, well educated.  Yet, the effect of such actions on the overall distribution of advantages, and hence cosmic unfairness, seems negligible.  
It thus seems implausible to say that the strict requirement of equal treatment within the family is derived from a duty to promote more equal distributions of resources generally.  Furthermore, if parents were subject to a more general duty to reduce (cosmically) unfair distributions, they would have to do much more than just favor their children equally.  They would have a duty to compensate the various people that are less advantaged than others, such as the untalented.  But as we have seen, there does not seem to be such a duty.  
In some cases, fair treatment may in fact require introducing inequalities.  For instance, treating the competitors for a music prize fairly will require giving the prize to the most talented performer even if she is better of than the other competitors.  On the assumption, held by the luck egalitarian, that no-one is at fault for being less talented than others, giving the prize out in this way will increase the amount of faultless inequality, and hence the amount of cosmic unfairness.  So clearly this is a case where a requirement of fair treatment is not best explained by a duty to prevent or reduce cosmic unfairness.  
I have been defending that claim while certain distributions may be cosmically unfair, there is no duty to correct cosmic unfairness.  Two considerations were advanced in support of this claim.  Firstly, there seem to mainly examples of cosmic unfairness that we do not have to do anything about, such as inequalities in natural talent.  Secondly, the examples of wrongs that might provide evidence for such a duty are best explained by other requirements, such as duties of beneficence or of fair treatment, which are not themselves grounded in a duty to correct cosmic unfairness.

5.
There is a reply the luck egalitarian can make to my claims, which I would like to briefly consider.  The luck egalitarian can point out that ordinary people are often quite limited in the information they have about how their actions will affect the overall distribution of advantages and also in their abilities to alter that distribution.  She can thus suggest that while people have a duty to reduce cosmic unfairness they should not in general aim to change the overall distribution of advantages themselves.  They should not, for instance, try to correct the disadvantages faced by people who are less talented in general.  They should instead focus on reducing disadvantages faced by people who they know a lot about and can help easily.  For instance, they should focus on ensuring that each of their children, whom they know a lot about and have easy access to, is not disadvantaged.  
This luck egalitarian reply to my arguments is similar to some of the claims utilitarians often make in defense of their view.  They too often appeal to people’s limited information and abilities to explain away some of the counter-intuitive aspects of their view.  Accordingly, there is a large literature discussing such appeals and it will not be possible to survey all of that here.  However, I will raise two problems for the luck egalitarian reply that I think are serious.  
Firstly, I am doubtful that even when we take into account people’s limited information and abilities the luck egalitarian can explain our ordinary responses to inequalities.  We have seen that the luck egalitarian can offer some reasons why individuals should focus on correcting the disadvantages of people who are familiar and accessible to them rather than trying to end global inequality directly.  However, I don’t think this suggestion is sufficient to explain the sharply different attitudes we have to inequalities in different contexts.  
We don’t think of inequalities due to natural talent as being merely difficult to repair, we don’t see any pressure to alter them.  By contrast, we find gendered wage inequalities within a company repulsive even where all members of the company earn significantly more than the median worker.  Changing these wage inequalities would have very little impact on overall cosmic unfairness but seems like a very important moral requirement.  It is hard to see how such sharply different attitudes to inequality in these different contexts could be justified just by appeal to limits on our information and abilities.  
Secondly, the luck egalitarian explanation for why we are concerned with inequality in some contexts and not others seems, on its face, to focus on the wrong facts.  On the luck egalitarian proposal the only difference, morally speaking, between my children and other children is that I know more about mine and can help them more easily.  But this conflicts with our ordinary understanding about why we must care for our children and care for them equally.  According to that ordinary understanding, helping my children equally is not a mere means to creating a more equal global distribution of advantages.  It is something I owe to my children in light of having accepted a responsibility to each of them to help them develop.  

6.
	We have seen that while some distributions of advantages may be cosmically unfair, there is no general duty to correct these distributions.  It thus seems to me that claims of cosmic injustice are going to be a poor ground for egalitarian views about the distribution of wealth within a state.  For, egalitarians do not think that inequalities of wealth within a state are merely unfortunate, they think those inequalities are unjust and that the state ought, all else being equal, to do something about them.  They are not asking us to pity those with fewer resources or regret the fact that our society contains enormous inequalities, they are asking us to endorse policies which do something about these inequalities.  Since there is no duty to correct cosmic unfairness, they cannot appeal to cosmic unfairness to defend their view that the state ought to correct inequalities in the distribution of wealth.  
	Of course, none of things I’ve said constitute a knock-down argument against the luck-egalitarian position.  Some people will hold steadfastly to the view that there is pervasive cosmic unfairness and that all individuals and institutions, including the state, have a duty to redress this unfairness.  But it should be clear at least that the luck egalitarian position is at odds with what many people think and so we quickly reach an argumentative deadlock. 
	I think it’s worth noting that claims about cosmic unfairness are sometimes made in political discourse and reflecting on what role those claims play.  Here is an example.  In 1977 Jimmy Carter was asked about a Supreme Court decision which ruled that the federal government did not have to fund abortions for those who could not otherwise afford them.  Carter said, “There are many things in life that are unfair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can’t.  But I don’t believe the federal government should take action to try to make these opportunities exactly equal.”​[6]​  Kennedy similarly said, fifteen years earlier, that certain inequalities are not unjust because “Life is unfair” and many similar things have been said since.  
	Clearly the unfairness that Carter is speaking of is cosmic unfairness; he’s trying to convince us that the differential access of rich and poor women to abortions is just cosmically unfair.  And he is using that claim not to motivate political action to address these inequalities but rather to justify inaction with respect to those inequalities.  Here, as elsewhere in familiar political discourse, the point of saying that an inequality is merely cosmically unfair, a feature of the “unfairness of life,” is to deny that anyone has a responsibility to do anything about it.  As an argument for equality in the public sphere, the luck egalitarian case is unlikely to generate much success.
	So, it is worth asking if there’s an argument that can be given for egalitarian policies that has more widely accepted premises than the luck egalitarian view.  We have seen that there is clearly and uncontroversially a duty to not treat people unfairly.  If egalitarian policies can be shown to be required as a matter of fair treatment then there will be a good case for them.  I thus propose, as an attractive alternative to the luck egalitarian view, what I will call the “Fair Treatment View”.  According to the Fair Treatment View, distributions of resources are unjust to the extent that they issue from unfair treatment of some individuals by other individuals.  I’m going to argue that we can defend egalitarianism by relying, in particular, on the requirement that the state treat its citizens fairly.  

7.
	First, though, let me say a few words about fair treatment more generally and what it might involve.  Fairness is, at least in part, a comparative notion; it concerns how some people are treated compared with others.  When we claim that someone is being unfairly treated, we often offer as evidence some difference in how they are being treated compared with others.  For instance, those who think that their company is remunerating them in an unfair manner will point out that other, similarly productive, members of the company are being  more handsomely reward.  What is unfair here is that the company is favoring some members over others, despite there being no relevant different between them.  
	More generally, we can say that unfair treatment exists where an agent or institution favors some people over others where there is no relevant difference between them.  Which differences between people are relevant?  This seems to me to vary according to the situation we are considering.  Parents should do more or less for their children depending on their needs.  The person awarding music prizes should favor the candidates who produced better performances.  The members of a car pool should receive the benefits of the scheme in proportion to their contributions.  In these different contexts, different features of the people involved are relevant: their needs, abilities, contributions and so on.  
	So it seems that what counts as inappropriate favoring, and which differences between people are relevant, depends a good deal on what situation and, especially, what agents or institutions, we are considering.  In particular, it seems to depend on what the appropriate roles or functions of the agents or institutions are.  For instance, parents should ensure that each of their children develops into a capable adult, and this will require helping them in proportion with their needs.  The person awarding a music prize should have the aim of promoting musical excellence and so should favor the contestants who have produced the best performance.  The function of the car pool is to provide rides for its members and so it is relevant if some members contribute more to that goal that others. 
	We should be skeptical, then, about whether there is a general rule for determining whether a given instance of favoring some people over others is inappropriate.  We should expect that there is no principle that applies across the board to tell us which differences between people are relevant or provide an appropriate basis for favoring them differentially.  But, as we have seen, we can still work out what is relevant in particular cases.  

8. 
	What, then, does the state have to do in order to treat its citizens fairly?  What distinctions are relevant in this context?  Which favorings and disfavorings are appropriate?  A number of deeply held shared convictions bear on this question, including some quite abstract ideas about the relation between state and citizen and some more concrete judgments about particular state decisions that we would consider fair or unfair.  
	We can think of a political society as a cooperative association whose members are the citizens.  Citizens cooperate together by accepting a common set of rules for interaction and doing so works to the advantage of each.  The rules are made by a central authority, the state, through collective decision, and these rules are binding on the members.​[7]​
	In some societies there have been different classes of membership in the political community, different classes of citizen.  For instance, in aristocratic societies, individuals could be born into higher and lower political classes.  Those born into the higher classes were considered more capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship and were also considered more worthy of civic benefits.  In an aristocratic society, the higher born are expected to fulfill civic duties, such as voting, from which others are excluded and are also entitled to advantages that are denied to other members of society.  For instance, the higher born might be granted a more extensive set of liberties, while other members are slaves or restricted in their freedom to practice their religion.  Or, the state might restrict access to certain economic goods, such as land or desirable jobs, to only those born within the appropriate class.  
	In a liberal democracy, we have a very different conception of the relation between state and citizen.  We think of all citizens as being equal members of the polity, all able to fulfill the responsibilities of membership, such as voting and upholding the law, and equally entitled to civic rights and benefits.  We think of all citizens as being equal members of the polity, irrespective of their race, sex, social class, natural talent and so on.  We expect the state's treatment of its citizens to reflect this fundamental equality of standing and hence we expect the state to treat differences of race, sex and so on between citizens as irrelevant.​[8]​
	These more abstract convictions about the relation between state and citizen are reflected in some of our more specific expectations about how the state ought to relate to the citizens.​[9]​  We think, for instance, that no citizen should be granted special exemptions from the law (that there should be, as we say, “equality before the law”).  We think that each citizen should be equally well protected by the police, regardless of their race, wealth or talent.  We think that there should be equal liberties of religion and conscience for citizens with different religions and moral views.  
	Thus, the equal status of every citizen as a member of the polity seems to require that the state favor each citizen equally, at least in the context of fundamental decisions about the “basic structure” of a society, its central social and economic institutions.​[10]​  Differences between citizens of race, sex, social class, natural talent and so on are irrelevant in this context and are not an appropriate basis for differential treatment.  We have seen what this means for goods such as police protection and so on.  What does it mean for justice in the distribution of resources? 

9. 
	Among the functions we expect the state to perform include putting in place various economic structures.  We expect the state to create and protect property rights, maintain a stable system of contract law, foster competition through anti-trust laws, and take various other measures that are needed to create a working economy for the benefit of the citizens.  The state's role in maintaining a working economy is more obvious during some periods than others, for instance it was particularly conspicuous during the “bailout” to ensure that American financial institutions persist, but the state's hand is there at all times.  The state has important choices to make about exactly which economic rules to enact and the choice of rules will profoundly affect the prospects different citizens face for access to resources.  
	For instance, in an aristocratic society, of the sort I mentioned earlier, certain sorts of property and the best jobs might be legally restricted to those born within a certain caste.  These rules would obviously work to the advantage of the higher born.  
	Instead, the state might create a competitive market economy with no such legal restrictions on access to jobs to property.  In this case there would not be the obvious favoring of those born into particular classes that we see in an aristocratic society.  However, the income any individual can gain in the open market will depend on how scarce and in demand her skills are.  And what skills she has will depend substantially on her class background and innate talents.  So, this economic system could be said to favor those born into wealthy families and with certain genetic endowments.  
	Another set of policies, those favored by so called “meritocrats,” is designed to ensure that individual prospects for wealth and income depend just on variations in natural talent.  Attempts are made to reduce the effects of class background on an individual’s prospects through such policies as heavy investment in public education and heavy taxation of estates.  This is an economic system that does not advantage those born wealthy but does advantage those born with certain natural talents.  
	Finally, the state might have, in addition to a market economy, certain redistributive policies, such as having some form of welfare state, progressive taxation and so on.  These policies would reduce the effect of both social class and natural talent on an individual’s prospects and generate more equal prospects for every citizen.  
	These are just a few, briefly articulated, policy options.  But they will suffice to illustrate the fact that the distribution of wealth between citizens depends substantially upon what rules the state chooses to enact.  Different sets of policies will work to the advantage of citizens with different characteristics, such as those born into wealthy families, those with greater natural talents and so on.  
	Some people will accept that state decisions have an important impact on the distribution of wealth, but will claim that this impact ought to be measured against the baseline of individuals’ pre-tax incomes, as determined by the operations of the “free market”.  For example, some people favor a flat tax rate on the grounds that it involves the government imposing a similar percentage burden on each citizen.  These people are assuming that the burdens the government imposes on any citizen have to be measured against a baseline of her pretax income.  
	For their view to be coherent, we have to think of pre-tax income levels as being fixed independently of government policies.  Only then would it make sense to use pre-tax incomes as a baseline against which to measure the impact of government policy on distribution.  In fact, however, the state is heavily involved in the process that determines citizens' pre-tax incomes.  
	To see this, consider the property rights individuals have, which play a large role in determining pre-tax incomes.  A “right to property” in an item consists in having various Hohfeldian claims, privileges and powers.​[11]​ These include, typically, the right to use the item without interference by others, the right to transfer it to others as a gift or bequest and the right to some of the income that it can be sold for.  
	Each of these rights associated with property is created and enforced by the state.  For instance, the state decrees that some item of physical capital is to be controlled exclusively by a particular individual and prevents others from using it.  The state decides whether an item may be passed on as a bequest and whether or not the police will intervene when someone tries to bequeath it.  And the state decides whether the owner may receive income from the sale of the item.​[12]​  
	Furthermore, there are various decisions to be made about the precise details of these rights.  For instance, the state must say when a will is needed for successors to receive an inheritance and what the content of such a will must be.  The state decides exactly how much of the income from the sale of an item should accrue to the seller.  
	Thus, I think it will not do to take the pre-tax distribution of wealth as a baseline against which we measure the effects of state policy.  That distribution is itself heavily determined by state measures.  State decisions determine both the pre-tax and post-tax distribution of wealth and hence have a pervasive impact on the resources that citizens hold.

10.
	Now, we saw earlier that in the context of fundamental state decisions about the social and economic structure of a society, differences between citizens, such as their race, social class and natural talents, are irrelevant and should not be a basis on which some citizens are favored over others.  The state must favor its citizens equally.  Thus, if the economic rules the state enacts are working, say, to the advantage of those that are born in higher social classes, then there is a complaint of unfairness that can be made by those born into lower classes, namely that they are being inappropriately disfavored by the state.  
	We are now in a position to see the basic argument for egalitarian policies on the Fair Treatment View.  The state makes rules that govern the basic structure of a society, including rules about the structure of the economy.  It has choices to make about which rules to adopt and the choice of rules has a pervasive impact on the distribution of resources.  
	But, as matter of fairness, the state must favor its citizens equally because, in the context of fundamental state decision making, all citizens are relevantly similar.    So, when rules are chosen such that some citizens have greater resources than others, those who fare less well can complain that the state has benefitted them less, and hence treated them unfairly.  Thus, unless inequalities can be given a special justification, the rules ought to be chosen with the aim of benefiting each citizen equally.  
	The relationship between state and citizen is an ongoing one, so the aim should not be that every economic decision at every moment favor every citizen equally but, rather, that the overall economic structure work over time to ensure that each citizens has roughly equal prospects for earning income and wealth, unless inequalities can be given a special justification.
	Here is the argument in summary: 
1.	X treats Y unfairly if X favors Z over Y and there is no relevant difference between Y and Z. 
2.	In the context of state decision making, differences between citizens are irrelevant.​[13]​  
	Thus, from 1. and 2.
3.	The state must not favor some citizens over others, it must favor its citizens equally.  
4.	Decisions made by the state have a pervasive impact on the distribution of wealth in a society. 
	Hence
5.	Inequalities of wealth reflect decisions by the state which benefit some citizens more than others.  
	Therefore, from 3 and 5,
6.	Conclusion: Inequalities of wealth issue from unfair treatment of some citizens by the state.  

	This is my first pass at the argument, but I think it needs to be revised slightly in light of an important objection, which I will now present.  The problem, according to the objection, is with premise 3.  It is true, the objector says, that the state must treat its citizens equally in making basic structural decisions.  But it is not the case that to treat its citizens equally the state must ensure that they have equal resources.  Rather the state must favor its citizens equally with respect to some other goods or rights, such as equal liberties.  	
	The reasoning behind the objection is as follows.  State policy ought to be made by considering the goods different policies would bring for citizens.  However, not all goods are proper objects of state concern.   There is some special set of goods which it is appropriate for the state to focus on.  For instance, many people have thought that individuals benefit from living piously whilst denying that a state should be concerned with ensuring that individuals live piously.  Some have said that a state is responsible for ensuring that its citizens have freedom of speech whilst denying that a state should be concerned with the ability of its citizens to express their ideas well or draw a crowd.  Let's call the set of goods the state ought to be concerned with the “political goods”.​[14]​  
	It is unfair if the state favor some citizens with respect to political goods.  But it is not unfair, according to the objector, if the state favors some citizens over others with respect to goods that are not political goods.  Thus, the objector’s suggestion is that premise 3 must be revised so that it says:
3*: The state must favor its citizens equally with respect to their holdings of political goods.  
	If we revise premise 3 in this way, which I think we should, then the inference from 3 and 5 to 6 must be questioned.  It is only valid if resources are a primary good.  An objector could deny that resources are a political good and hence resist the conclusion that inequalities of resources are the result of unfair treatment.  
	Any example of such reasoning may found in a number of Supreme Court decisions.  For instance, in Rodriguez the court had to evaluate school funding policies that resulted in education of different quality for students living in different areas.​[15]​  Because of the funding policies, poorer quality public education was offered to children in poorer areas.  The court ruled, roughly, that despite their receiving a lower quality public education, children in the poorer areas had not been treated unfairly by the state.  
	Simplifying substantially, an important argument in the majority opinion was that education, except up to a minimal level, is not a political good or not among the goods that the state must be centrally concerned with providing for its citizens (at least, as required by the constitution).​[16]​  The court majority agreed that an individual’s educational level is very important to her life chances and well-being.​[17]​  But it denied that this importance is enough to make it a political good.​[18]​	
	We need to consider, then, whether resources are a political good so that we can evaluate whether inequalities of resources within a state are unfair.  How could we show that resources are a political good?  Agreeing with the supreme court, I do not think it will suffice to point out that having resources is important to an individual’s life prospects.  However, I think the following considerations make it plausible to think that resources are a political good.  
	The policies that we expect a government to enact include creating a working economy.  In liberal democracies, it is usually expected, in particular, that a government will have policies which support a market economy such as the creation of private property rights, the enforcement of contracts, limited liability rules for certain firms and so on.  
	Given that we think creating and maintaining an economy is a core function of government, we can ask what the rationale is for these policies.  Why is it that a government should perform these economic functions?  A very plausible answer is that having these policies creates wealth and hence results in citizens having resources.  Thus, it seems that the state should be concerned with ensuring that its citizens have resources.  It seems that resources are a political good.​[19]​  
	Thinking about the economic functions of government in this way is also attractive because it allows us to give a more unified rationale for some of the various functions we expect the state to perform.  Some of these functions, as we have seen, include creating and supporting an economy.  Another core function of government is protecting a set of core liberties for citizens, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association and so on.  
	Take freedom of speech.  Whatever benefit there is to an individual from having freedom of speech is increased by her possessing resources.  Having formal freedom of speech provides her with an opportunity to speak without interference.  With more resources she is better placed to exercise that opportunity.  For instance, with her freedom of speech protected, an individual can publish pamphlets about politics, sex or religion without having the police or other citizens interfere with her.  However, this opportunity to publish without molestation is much more useful to her if she has the resources to actually produce and disseminate the pamphlets.  
	Thus, whatever rationale there is for ensuring that individuals have freedom of speech extends to ensuring that they have resources.  Hence, if we think, as I proposed, that the economic functions of the state are justified by their role in helping citizens obtain resources, then those functions can be given the same rationale as provision of liberties.  Both the state's economic functions and its liberty providing functions could be given a common basis.  This would be attractive and is a further reason to think of resources as a political good.
	Thus, by relying on requirements of fair treatment, in this case the requirement that the state treat its citizens fairly, we can argue for an egalitarian view about distributive justice.  We can argue that inequalities are unjust, or unjust unless they can be given a special justification, because they issue from unfair treatment of some citizens by the state.  
	There remain a number of important questions and problems for the egalitarian.  For instance, I have said nothing about how considerations of freedom and responsibility might fit into this picture.  And, of course, there are large empirical question about exactly which policies will satisfy the broad principles I have suggested, although it seems very likely that some intervention to correct the inequalities of a competitive market economy will be needed.  What I hope to have given you is an account of how I think the basic fairness based case for egalitarianism should be made.  We can avoid the problems of relying on “cosmic unfairness,” as the Luck Egalitarian does, to justify an egalitarian view and, instead, adopt the Fair Treatment View.  

11.
	So far, we've been discussing distributive justice within the context of an individual society.  I've defended a view about how best to defend egalitarian policies in that context by appealing to fairness.  I'm now going to turn to the implications of what I've said so far for distributive justice in the global sphere.  Distributive justice in this sphere concerns the distribution of wealth across political borders, between different societies or between the individuals that inhabit different societies.  
	One clearly  important duty when considering the global sphere is the duty of humanitarianism that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper.  Huge portions of the world's population live in conditions of immense poverty and, in so far as this is possible, we should be doing something about this (though it is difficult to know how).  This duty is not my main focus in this paper, though it is an important duty in this context.  
	Political philosophers have asked whether there is more to the morality of global wealth than considerations of humanitarianism.  They have considered whether in addition to considerations of humanitarianism there are also considerations of fairness or justice that arise in the global context.  In particular, they have asked what principles of global justice an egalitarian about domestic justice is committed to.  
	So, what does a commitment to egalitarianism in the domestic sphere commit you to globally?  Well, it all depends on what the justification for egalitarianism in the domestic context is.  Suppose we defend domestic egalitarianism as the luck egalitarian does, by appealing to cosmic unfairness.  If we take this route, then we will be committed to applying the same principles of justice in the global sphere as we do at home.  
	The animating idea behind luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair for someone to have less than someone else through no fault of their own.  But, clearly, being born in one country rather than another is not something for which an individual can be held responsible.  So, if some people have less than others simply because they are born into one society rather than another, this is unfair by luck egalitarian standards.  Thus, on the luck egalitarian view, state borders are irrelevant in determining which distributions of income and wealth are unjust.  Whatever sort of equality we demand at home must also be demanded across the globe.  
	A number of theories of global justice have been developed along these lines, for instance, in the recent work of Simon Caney and Kok-Chor Tan.​[20]​  If my earlier arguments are correct, then these authors are making a mistake.  I have suggested that we should not rely on the idea of cosmic unfairness to justify egalitarianism in the domestic context.  If this is right, then Caney, Tan and others are resting their theories of global justice on a mistaken view about what fairness requires of us.  Their arguments for extending egalitarian principles directly from the domestic sphere to the global are thus unsound.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that global egalitarianism is wrong, but that it would need a very different defense.  
	What about my own view about how to defend egalitarianism within a society?  What are the implications of my Fair Treatment View for global justice?  I argued that a theory of distributive justice should rely centrally on the notion fair treatment.  The duties we have of distributive justice, I suggested, are duties to treat people fairly.  In particular, I argued that for a state to treat its citizens fairly, it must enact economic policies that work to the equal advantage of each citizen.  This was because, I claimed, there is a more general requirement that a state favor its citizens equally.  
	Clearly, this argument for why the state must ensure roughly equal economic prospects for its citizens does not entail a duty for the state to ensure such prospects for all persons, since the state is not required to favor all persons equally.  Furthermore, in the absence of a global state, there is no institution at the global level that would be subject to the same requirements of fairness as the states we know.  
	Thus, on my view we cannot develop a theory of global justice by just taking whatever principle of distributive justice we endorse domestically and applying them straightforwardly in the global context.  So that simple approach to global justice must be abandoned.  
	This might seem to push us towards another simple approach to global justice.  This view, at the opposite extreme to the luck egalitarian view, is the position, recently defended by Tom Nagel and Michael Blake, that there are no considerations of distributive justice in the global sphere.​[21]​  
	I think this approach is also mistaken.  All that we have seen so far is that we should not think the same principles of distributive justice apply at the global level as apply within a state.  This leaves open the possibility that some other, perhaps quite different, considerations of justice do apply in the global sphere.  And, under conditions of globalization where there are new institutions, cooperative relations between states and so on, it is very plausible to think that some consideration of justice do apply in the global sphere.​[22]​  In particular, it is plausible to think there will be requirements of fair treatment. 
	In the remainder of this paper, I am going to illustrate how such requirements might be invoked, by looking at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  I am not going to develop here a full theory of justice for the WTO, let alone of  global distributive justice more generally.  I'm just going to show how requirements of fair treatment may apply to decisions made in the WTO and hence illustrate how, on the Fair Treatment View, considerations of justice can arise in the global sphere.  This will be some evidence for my suggestion that by relying on the idea of fair treatment we can have a theory of distributive justice which says neither that the same distributive norms apply in the global sphere as in the domestic one, nor that distributive norms only apply in the domestic sphere.  

12.
	The WTO is an organisation within which various member states negotiate a common set of rules governing terms of trade.  Essentially, the aim of the organisation is to help encourage trade across political borders and lower barriers to it.  Of course, though this is not always emphasised, increasing the volume of trade is not an end in itself.  The justification for trade is that it is supposed to bring with it various economic benefits to the countries involved, including greater productivity, growth and development.  
	So, the members of the WTO are part of a cooperative enterprise for the sake of benefits to all and the benefits are created through the existence of a shared set of rules that are enacted by and apply to all the members.  But different sets of rules will have quite different impacts on countries of different kinds.  In other words, some rules will favor countries of one kind and other rules will favor countries of another sort.  Members can thus question whether the rules that they are being asked to sign up for are inappropriately favoring or disfavoring them.  Thus, it is plausible to think that questions about fairness of treatment should arise here; questions about whether the rules that are being enacted inappropriately favor some countries over others.  
	And sure enough, such questions are raised in ongoing political debates.  Take, for instance, Joseph Stiglitz's criticisms of existing trade rules.​[23]​  Stiglitz argues that the rules which have been enacted have typically worked disproportionately to the advantage of richer, and hence more powerful, countries over poorer ones and he offers two main grounds for this view.  
	Firstly, he argues that previous trade regimes have imposed special costs on developing countries and hence disadvantaged them.  The costs are due to the difficulties that developing countries have in maintaining full employment.  A rule that requires member states to drop their tariffs with respect to certain goods, says Stiglitz, should have relatively few costs (and many benefits) to a developed country.  Increased competition with foreign firms may mean that some domestic business will be forced to close.  But, perhaps with some help from the government, it should be possible for their workers to move into new jobs, in more productive sectors.  
	In developing countries, according to Stiglitz, the situation is quite different.  Workers who are laid off due to increased competition do not typically end up in new, more productive employment.  They simply remain unemployed.  And significantly increased unemployment is a huge cost for a developing country.  
	Secondly, Stiglitz argues that previous WTO rounds have negotiated settlements where the benefits from trade have mainly accrued to developed countries.  In particular, he suggests that there has been much greater reduction in tariffs for goods that developed countries have an interest in exporting, while there are still large tariffs and subsidies in the developed world for goods that developing countries have an interest in exporting, such as agricultural produce and labour intensive manufactured goods.  
	Thus, according to Stiglitz, previous rounds of trade negotiations have resulted in decisions that have favored developed countries over developing ones, because they have imposed special costs on developing countries and because their benefits have been mainly to developed countries.  And this, he claims, is unfair.  The unfairness he claims to have identified is unfairness of treatment.  The rules that have been enacted in the WTO, he claims, have inappropriately favored some members over others.  
	Why have developed countries been favored?  Mainly, Stiglitz suggests, because of their superior bargaining power, their better access to information, the larger teams they can send to the negotiations and so on.  In short, the developed countries are more powerful and trade deals have favored the more powerful.  This, we might say, is inappropriate because having a better bargaining position is plausibly not something that makes one country relevantly different to another in this context: it is not a reason for favoring one country over another in deciding which set of rules to adopt.  
	Oxfam has made similar complaints about the WTO, such as those published in their “Rigged Rules and Double Standards”.  Their concern is also with unfair treatment.  For  instance, they write: “The international trading system is not a force of nature. It is a system of exchange, managed by rules and institutions that reflect political choices. Those choices can prioritise the interests of the weak and vulnerable, or the interests of the wealthy and powerful.”​[24]​  
	Of course, there are very substantial empirical assumptions behind the claims of Stiglitz and Oxfam and this is not the place to defend those.  Many economists, I recognise, will disagree with their claims.  My point is just to illustrate the Fair Treatment View, to show that a plausible looking argument about injustice in the global sphere can be made by relying on requirements of fair treatment, in this case fair treatment of members of the WTO by the decision making body.  
	Those who resist Stiglitz' claims, on normative grounds, can also often be seen making arguments about fair treatment.  For instance, economist T.N. Srinivasan claims that even if WTO decisions have typically favored the developed countries, this has still not been unjust.  He writes of Stiglitz' complaints that “it is not obvious why the share of benefits from an agreement that accrues to poorer countries necessarily has to rise for it to be fair.  Why is an agreement, which delivers a Pareto improvement over the status quo in the sense of benefiting every member of the WTO but in which a large share of the benefits accrue to richer countries, unfair?”​[25]​  Srinivasan's suggestion is that fairness just demands that WTO decisions give some weight to the interests of each member country, even if some countries are favored more than others.  But he is not disagreeing that there is some sort of requirement of fair treatment involved here, just disagreeing about the interpretation of that requirement.  And it is consistent with his argument that different requirements of fairness would play a role in the domestic setting.  
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^1	 In the rest of the paper I will sometimes drop the qualification “unless they can be given a special justification,” but it should be assumed throughout.  
^2	  See Cohen (1989) and (2008); Arneson (1989) and (2001) and Roemer (1994), (1996) and (1998).  
^3	  Cohen (2008) p.7.  
^4	  Some may deny this and claim instead that the unfairness of the treatment involved derives from its contribution to a distribution which is, independently, unfair.  I will discuss this suggestion in the next section.  
^5	 I will argue later that people such as Shaq are not wealthy just because of their natural talents but because of the effects of state decisions about how to regulate the economy and that, hence, their greater wealth can be traced to unfair treatment.  My point here is just that the influence of natural talent on a distribution is not enough to make us think it is unjust.  
^6	  Carter (1977), p.1237.  I don't mean to endorse Carter's opinion here, just to note the use he makes of the idea of cosmic unfairness.  Indeed, I think he is wrong to describe inequalities between rich and poor women as merely part of the unfairness of “life,” since, as we will see, I think inequalities in a society issue from unfair treatment.  
^7	  Rawls (1971) similarly suggests that citizens can be seen as members of a cooperative association.  
^8	  What I say is one interpretation of Rawls’ remarks that citizens are viewed as “free and equal” in a liberal democracy.  See Rawls (1971).  Also, see Dworkin (2001), who claims that the state must show “equal concern for its citizens”.  
^9	 Here I draw on Cohen (1989).  
^10	 The term “basic structure” was introduced by Rawls (1971).  
^11	 See, for instance, Thomson (1992).  
^12	 The idea that these rights are created by the state will be resisted by Lockeans such as Nozick (1974) but it would take us too far afield to discuss their arguments in detail.  
^13	 This premise and, hence, premise 3 need to be qualified so that they only concern fundamental state decisions about the basic structure.  Individual policies may permissibly favor some citizens over others.  I leave out the qualification in the text to make the argument clearer.  
^14	  What I call “political goods” are similar to Rawls' “primary goods”, at least he used the term in later works.  For instance, Rawls (1996), on p.179, tells us that an index of primary goods provides a “conception of citizens’ needs - that is, of persons’ needs as citizens”.  I think what he had in mind in this passage is roughly the idea I describe in the text.  
^15	  San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973).  
^16	  In the court’s vocabulary, education was deemed to not be a “fundamental right”.  
^17	  ‘We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society" cannot be doubted.’
^18	  “But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.’
^19	  There is room for debate about whether resources themselves are the relevant political good or some other related good(s), such as “capabilities”.  This is too large a debate to survey here but its outcome does not affect the main line of my argument.  See, for instance, Nussbaum (2006) for discussion.
^20	  Caney (2006) and Tan (2004).  
^21	  Blake (2001) and Nagel (2005).  
^22	 Cohen and Sabel (2006) make similar points in reply to Nagel.  
^23	  Stiglitz, and Charlton (2005).  
^24	  Oxfam (2002).  
^25	  Srinivasan (2005), p.12.
